ترجمۀ سیاسی – متن شمارۀ ۱

(پنجشنبه ۲۴ بهمن ۹۲)

دانشجویان گرامی، لطفاً متن زیر را ترجمه و در دو نسخه همراه خود بیاورید.


After eight years of U.S.-led state-building efforts, thousands of coalition force fatalities, and nearly one trillion dollars spent, Iraq is drifting toward authoritarianism under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Dawa Party while al-Qaeda-stoked violence is running at levels not seen in years. Although Washington's 2007 counterinsurgency strategy laid the groundwork for a pluralistic and representative government, as long as the country's current leaders have little motivation to abide by the rule of law, the future of a democratic Iraq looks grim.

Early Missteps

As the George W. Bush administration geared up for an intervention in 2003, it debated a post-invasion plan for leaving behind a state "based on moderation, pluralism, and democracy". But by April 2003, the chaos of post-Saddam Iraq prompted a change in plans. According to Bremer's 540-day "Iraq's Path to Sovereignty" plan, a constitution would need to be drafted, elections held, and a political framework developed before any handover of sovereignty.

If such an arrangement had taken place in a vacuum, the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA) emphasis on building the legitimacy of the nascent Iraqi state through process and elections would have been sound. But amid sectarian tensions and Sunni fears of disenfranchisement and retribution, process alone did little to bridge Iraq's "sovereignty gap." The CPA's fixation on procedure and sequencing overlooked a key insight highlighted by authors Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart in Fixing Failed States: A "state based on the consent of citizens and legitimacy of rules is likely to be more enduring than one imposed by force."